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Abstract: 
            Most of the empirical evidence has shown that the majority of oil dependent countries 
have the low level of financial development; thus, they are much more volatile and exposed to 
the oil shocks and the so named “oil curse”. This paper aims to investigate the impact of the 
Algerian financial system—as one of major oil economies—on the economic growth and 
escaping the oil curse. Over the past two decades, Algeria has courageously attempted to 
modernize its financial system despite social strife and challenges posed by the large 
hydrocarbon sector and an inefficient public sector. In fact, various reforms have been 
undertaken since the early 1990s to the transition from planned to an open market economy. 
          So, the first section provides the research background based on a theoretical model and a 
set of empirical studies about financial development and the oil curse. An analytical framework 
of the Algerian financial system evolution is provided in the second section, focusing on the 
two phases: 1990-1999 and 2000-2011. Finally, using an econometric growth regression model 
to test the impact of financial development in Algeria over the period 1980-2014, the 
preliminary results show that the financial development enhanced economic growth but it has 
not contributed in reducing the negative effect of oil rents.  
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I - Introduction:  
The last two decades have witnessed a booming of literature on the relationship between 
natural resources and economic growth under the so-called “resource curse” hypothesis. What 
are the main causes beyond such curse and which remedies can be suggested to escape it?  
  Most of the empirical evidence has shown that the majority of resource dependent 
countries have the low level of financial development (Gelb 1988, 2010; Sachs and Warner 
1997, 2001; Cordon and Neary 1982; Frenkel 2012; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2005; 
Albadawi and Soto 2012). Hence, developed financial institutions are one of the solutions to 
pulse the economic growth and escape the curse driven by resource rents. Algeria, as one of the 
major oil exporters and producers countries, has courageously attempted to modernize its 
financial system despite social strife and challenges posed by the large hydrocarbon sector and 
an inefficient public sector. In fact, various reforms have been undertaken since the early 1990s 
to the transition from planned to an open market economy. 
This paper aims to investigate in the impact of the Algerian financial system, on the 
economic growth and escaping the oil curse and seeks to answer the question: Have the 
financial reforms contributed in enhancing economic growth, and have they diminished the 
negative effect of the oil rents? 
To do so, the research is divided into three sections: the first section provides the 
research background based on a theoretical model and a set of empirical studies about financial 
development and the oil curse. An analytical framework of the Algerian financial system 
evolution is provided in the second section, focusing on the two phases: 1990-1999 and 2000-
2011. Finally, using an econometric growth regression model to test the impact of financial 
development in Algeria over the period 1990-2011, the preliminary results show that the 
financial development enhanced economic growth but it has not contributed in reducing the 
negative effect of oil rents. 
II - Research backgrounds: 
II-1 - The natural resource curse hypothesis: 
The natural resource curse—or more specifically the oil curse—is a phenomenon which 
appears in most countries endowed with the natural resources. Such countries suffer from bad 
performance in their economic growth, in which there exists a negative relationship between 
the resource abundance and the economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1997, 2001). 
There are two know explanations when examining the “oil curse”. The first explanation 
is purely economic, starting with the “Dutch Disease” (Cordon and Neary 1982), then the 
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procyclicality of fiscal policy (Kaminsky and Reinhart 2005), and the recent volatility view 
(Aghion and Banarjee 2005). The second explanation, however, inserts the role of politics and 
institutional quality to explain that curse. 
The Dutch Disease Channel: 
       The Dutch Disease appears when the boom in the resource sector squeezes other non-
resource tradable sectors by making a pressure on the real exchange rate (Cordon and Neary 
1982). The key variable in this channel is the real exchange rate: a boom in the resource sector 
boosts the exports of this sector which leads to a real appreciation of the exchange rate through 
the high inflows of the foreign currency. Such appreciation will hurt the profitability of other 
non-resource sectors. 
Volatility and procyclicality of fiscal policy: 
Most of commodities, especially oil, are characterized by a high volatility in their prices, 
such volatility negatively affects the economic growth in resource dependent countries (Aghion 
and Banarjee 2005). This effect is related with the degree of financial development. Many 
recent studies have explained the volatility view of the curse. 
 Aghion et al. (2006) showed that macroeconomic volatility driven by exchange rate 
fluctuations affects growth in countries with thin capital markets. In the same framework, F.Van 
Der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2008) argued that the volatility of natural resources causes a severe 
volatility of output per capita. Furthermore, P.Collier and B.Goderis (not dated), in their 
empirical analysis, showed a positive short term effect of commodity price on output but 
negative long term effects. 
 The volatility of the oil windfalls in exporting countries leads to the so-called 
“procyclicality” of macroeconomic policies and capital flows. Fiscal policy is contractionary in 
bad times—when the oil receipts decline—and expansionary in good times—in a boom 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh 2005). Procyclical capital flows are also resulting from the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy (Frenkel 2012). As for the monetary policy, its procyclicality is 
related to the exchange rate regime. 
The political and institutional explanation: 
Beyond the economic explanation of the oil curse, the recent researches found a crucial 
role of politics and institutions quality in occurring and exacerbating this curse. Strong 
institutions, governance, democracy and human capital represent key determinants in managing 
the oil revenues and achieving development in oil rich countries. In fact, an important empirical 
literature confirmed that. 
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Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2005) argued that natural resource dependence affects 
growth negatively when institutional quality is bad. Arezki and Gylfason (2011) linked the 
economic aspect of the curse with the political one, where their empirical results showed that 
the volatility channel leads to an increase in non-resource growth in democracies but the inverse 
for the autocracies. Ross (1999) discussed the role of politics in the occurrence of the oil 
curse through rent seeking behavior. Using a flexible econometric model, Albadawi and A.Soto 
(2012) found that the existence of the oil curse is conditional on bad political governance. 
II-2 - The theoretical model: 
In their famous book about growth and volatility, Aghion and Banarjee (2005) argued 
that the macroeconomic volatility driven by terms of trade or commodity price shocks may slow 
innovations and depress growth in economies with poorly developed financial institutions. 
To simply understand the argument of Aghion, we pursue the following demonstration1: 
 The price level Pt is closed to the nominal exchange rate St :  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡𝑃𝑡
∗                   𝑃𝑡 
∗ ~ 1 
 The nominal wages Wt are pre-determined:  
𝑊𝑡 =  ∅ 𝐴𝑡 𝐸[𝑃𝑡]    𝑊𝑡 =  ∅ 𝐴𝑡 𝐸[𝑆𝑡] : ∅ < 1  is a constant, At is the productivity. 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡√𝑙𝑡 : is the equation of output following the production function where (lt) 
indicates the employment.  
 The profits are determined by: 𝜋𝑡 ≡ 𝐴𝑡 𝑆𝑡 √𝑙𝑡 −  ∅𝐴𝑡 𝐸[𝑆𝑡] 𝑙𝑡  
 The next period’s value of innovations:  𝑉𝑡+1 = 𝑉𝑃𝑡+1 𝐴𝑡+1 / 𝐴𝑡+1 =  𝛾𝐴𝑡 
The constant γ is superior to the unity if entrepreneurs have sufficient funds to innovate, 
otherwise: 𝐴𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝑡. Note that firms have sufficient funds (profits plus resource revenues Qt) 
to innovate if they have enough cash flow to deal with the adverse liquidity shocks which is 
interpreted by the equation:  
 𝜇 (𝜋𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑄𝑡) > 𝑧 𝑃𝑡 𝐴𝑡 : µ is a measure of financial development, z is a random 
liquidity shock. 
 The probability of innovation represented by the cumulative density function:  
 𝑝𝑡 = 𝐹(
𝜇(𝜋𝑡+𝑆𝑡𝑄𝑡)
𝑆𝑡 𝐴𝑡
) (1) 
This implies that the higher the profits (πt) and the more developed financial system (µ), 
the higher the ability of firms to overcome liquidity shocks and thus the higher the probability 
of innovations.  
                                                          
1 Van der ploag F., Poelhekke S., “Volatility and natural resource curse”,ibid, P6. 
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 The economic growth rate is given by:   𝑔𝑡 =  
𝐸[𝐴𝑡+1]− 𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡
  
                                                                            𝑔𝑡 = (𝛾 − 1)𝐸[𝑝𝑡] (2) 
From equations (1) and (2), the economic growth increases with the expected 
probability of innovation. Consequently, the higher and stable resource revenues eases credit 
constraints with high developed financial system (µ) which improve the innovations and boost 
economic growth.  
II-3 - The relevant literature on the linkage between financial 
development and resource curse: 
Most of the empirical evidence has shown that the majority of oil dependent countries 
have the low level of financial development. The literature also argued that financial 
development and good financial institutions are needed to spur economic growth and escape 
the natural resource curse. 
    Using panel autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in mean (ARCH-M) for the period 
1970-2003, Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2008)1 found that countries with poorly developed 
financial systems are much more volatile and more exposed to the natural resource curse via 
volatility channel. They concluded that countries can even turn the curse into a blessing. There 
is evidence for a positive direct effect of natural resource dependence on growth after 
controlling for volatility; the key to a turn-around for many resource-rich countries is financial 
development. Christian Hattendor (2013) 2  showed empirically that resource-rich countries 
appear to have a less developed financial system using cross-sectional and panel analysis. The 
author utilized an instrument for credit demand based on exogenous geographic determinants. 
In their paper, Hooshmand, Hosseini and Moghani (2013)3 examined the direct and indirect 
impact of the oil rent on financial development using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
for 17 selected oil exporting countries, over the period 2002-2010. The result suggested that oil 
rent has had a negative effect on financial development (through institutional quality channel 
and weakening it) and has provided the context of the weakening financial markets in two direct 
and indirect ways. Using similar methodology (GMM), Bakwena and Bodma (2008)4 evaluated 
the role played by financial development in oil vis-à-vis non-oil (mining) economies for the 
                                                          
1 Van der ploag F., Poelhekke S., “Volatility and natural resource curse”, university of Oxford, 2008. 
2 Hattendorff, Christian ; “The Natural Resource Curse Revisited: Is There a Financial Channel?”;  Conference     Paper; Session: Economic 
Development and Technological Change, No. D10-V3; 2013. 
3 Hooshmand, Hosseini and Moghani; “Oil Rents, Institutions and Financial Development: Case Study of selected Oil Exporting Countries”; 
Research Journal of Recent Sciences  ISSN 2277-2502 Vol. 2(12), 100-108, December (2013). 
4 Bakwena and Bodma; “The Role of Financial Development in Natural Resource Abundant Economies: Does the Nature of the Resource 
Matter?”; BOJE: Botswana Journal of Economics; 2008; PP 16-31. 
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period 1984-2003. The data revealed that financial development plays a crucial role in 
influencing the efficiency of investment, thus economic performance of these economies. 
However, the potency of financial institutions is highly dependent on whether the economy is 
an oil or non-oil (mining) producer. Bakwena and Seemule (2013)1 argued theoretically that 
good institutions remedy the resource curse, and they confirmed empirically their hypothesis 
using a panel of up to 53 countries over the period 1984-2003. 
III - Overview on the Algerian financial sector: 
Over the past two decades Algeria has courageously attempted to modernize its financial 
system despite social strife and unique challenges posed by the large hydrocarbon sector. 
However, lending by state-owned banks, mostly to public entities, still dominates financial 
intermediation, financial markets remain in their infancy, and the implementation of otherwise 
laudable regulatory reforms is lagging. Because of hydrocarbon-funded state support to 
borrowers and lenders alike, the financial system appears stable although this “stability” carries 
high costs and distorts risk pricing and governance2. 
The Algerian financial system is dominated by the banking sector which accounts for 
93 percent of total financial system assets. It constitutes of twenty nine (29) banks and financial 
institutions where: six public banks, 14 private banks with foreign capitals in which one with 
mixed capital, three financial institutions in which two are public, 5 leasing companies, and one 
mutual insurance with the status of a financial institution3. 
 
Table1: The structure of the Algerian banking sector. 
 
Source: International Institute of Finance 2010. 
 
                                                          
1 Bakwena and Seemule; “SUSTAINING NATURAL RESOURCE BOOMS: ARE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS A SOLUTION?”; Int. J. 
Eco.Res., 2013, v4i3, 21-33. 
2 Bakwena and Bodma; “The Role of Financial Development in Natural Resource Abundant Economies: Does the Nature of the Resource 
Matter?”; BOJE: Botswana Journal of Economics; 2008; PP 16-31. 
3 Data are brought from the annual report of the Bank of Algeria (Rapport d’activité 2012). 
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III-1 - The financial reforms during 1990-1999 
After the crisis of 1986 and the failure of the centralized planed system, the Algerian 
government started to privatize its economy with 1990 as a key transitional year. Algeria 
implemented several reforms starting by the financial sector under the following objectives1: 
reduction of the direct government intervention and strengthen the role of market forces in the 
allocation of financial resources, improvement of the financial institutions capacity to mobilize 
the domestic saving, enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy instruments, promoting 
competition among banks, and strengthening their financial soundness. In April 1990, Algeria 
adopted the law on currency and credit (90-10) to grant greater independence to the central 
bank (Bank of Algeria since 1990) and strengthen its capacity for banking supervision. Under 
this law and during the decade of 1990s, the following decisions have been taken:  
 Deposit interest rates were fully liberalized and ceilings on lending rates were replaced 
by limits on banking spreads in 1994. 
 The transfer of monetary policy responsibilities to the central banks and the 
recapitalization of commercial banks. 
 Foreign participation in the capital of the domestic banks was allowed since 1994. 
 The dismantling of the restrictions on the use of foreign exchange began in April 1994 
and an interbank foreign exchange market was established since 1996. 
It can be observable that most of the reforms have been applied since 1994 which was the year 
of starting the programs of structural adjustment instructed by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. 
III-2 - Financial reforms during 2000-2012: 
In this period, the financial reforms continued to be applied under a regulatory and 
technical framework in which we stress the following points2: 
 Order 03-11 on Currency and Credit. 
 The fivefold increase in the minimum capital requirement for banks and finance 
companies. 
                                                          
1 Jbili, Enders and Treichel ; « Financial sector reforms in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia : a preliminary assessment » ; International 
Monetary Fund working paper 97/81; 1997; P12. 
2 CGAP; “Microfinance in Algeria: challenges and opportunities”; Joint CGAP and AFD Mission under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Finance Deputy Minister for Financial Reform; Final Report June 2006. 
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 The establishment of a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) 1  system for large-value 
payments in February 2006, and a clearing system for retail payments in the first half of 
2006. 
 The legislation on mortgage securitization. 
 Financial leasing for real estate, factoring, promotion of venture capital. 
 The overhaul of the Algiers stock exchange since 2003. 
 The fight against money laundering. 
 The strengthening of the internal audit function (audit committees) and personnel 
management function at government banks (performance contracts). 
 Order n° 10-04 of August 26th 2010 which modifies and completes the order 03-11. 
The figure below shows the evolution in the key variables of the banking system during the 
period of the study: 
 
Figure 1: the evolution of the banking system’s variables 1990-2012 
 
Source: Calculated by the author using data from the World Bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The RTGS16 system has been operational since early February 2006. It handles large-value interbank payments with a minimum payment 
amount of DZD 1 million. 
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IV - The econometric study: 
IV-1 - Data and methodology: 
To empirically show the role of the financial development in escaping the oil curse, the 
research tests the effect of two financial development indicators and the oil rents on the Algerian 
economic growth using growth regression estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS). 
IV-1.1 - Description of the data: 
The data are all taken from the world development indicators (the World Bank data 
basis) for the period 1980-2014 (35 observations). 
Financial indicators: 
In order to show the financial development effect, we use first the domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector (Credit), this variable has been used before by Arezki and 
Gylfason (2011) and Vand der ploeg and Poalhekke (2008). The second financial indicator used 
is the domestic credit to the private sector (Private). Data are measured as percentage of GDP. 
Economic growth: 
The variable is calculated by the annual growth rate of the real gross domestic product 
per capita at constant 2005 U.S.D. 
Oil rents: 
The variable measures the dependence of Algerian economy on oil rents and is 
calculated by the share of oil rents in total GDP. This variable is used to show the evidence of 
the oil curse.  
IV-1.2 - Methodology: 
The model of the study examines the effect of financial development on the oil curse 
over the period 1980-2014. To do so, 5 multiple linear regression models have been estimated 
using the Ordinary Least Squares method estimator. 
Model 1: 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛽3 (𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
Model 2: 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛽3 (𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡 
Model 3: 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛽3 (𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡 
Model 4: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛽3 (𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡)𝑡  + 𝜇𝑡 
Model 5: 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝛽3 (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡 +  𝜇𝑡 
𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3,and  𝛽4, are the parameters to be estimated; 
𝑦𝑡−1: is the lagged value of the real GDP per capita growth rate (y). 
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IV-2 - The empirical results: 
The time series analysis for the four variables used indicated the non-stationarity of the 
series; except the oil rents series; in the level under the ADF and PP unit roots tests, while the 
1st differenced are stationary which allows us to use these series in the estimation. (The t-
statistics and critical values show the stationarity of the 1st differenced series for all the variables 
at the 5% level.) 
The following table summarizes the estimation results for the 5 regression models 
mentioned above: 
Table 2: Summary of growth regressions with OLS estimations (dependent variable: real 
GDP growth rate (y)) 
Independent variables 
(explanatory) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Lagged(y) 𝑦𝑡−1 0.37 
(2.16)** 
0.35 
(2.04)** 
0.35 
(1.91)* 
0.51 
(3.25)*** 
0.48 
(2.88)*** 
Oilrent  0.11 
(1.58) 
0.12 
(1.60) 
0.11 
(1.53) 
  
Credit   0.02 
(0.5) 
 0.01 
(0.34) 
 
Private    0.02 
(0.38) 
 0.02 
(0.47) 
The constant  -0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.01 
(-1.04) 
-0.009 
(0.93) 
0.004 
(1.004) 
0.004 
(1.04) 
R-squared 32% 32% 32% 26% 27% 
Adjusted R-squared  27% 25% 25% 22% 22% 
F-statistic 7.15*** 4.73*** 4.68*** 5.53*** 5.6*** 
Values in parenthesis are the absolute values of the t-statistics. *, **, *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations using EVIEWS 6 program. 
The results for the model 1 shows that the real GDP growth is positively and 
significantly affected by its lagged value; it also shows no evidence of the oil curse. We found 
a positive association between oil rents and economic growth which reflects the high 
dependency of the Algerian economy on the hydrocarbon revenues and this has been during the 
different phases of the national economy. Meanwhile, the adjusted R-squared indicates that the 
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variables used contribute with only 25% in the explication of the model, but this ratio is highly 
significant. 
In order to show the role of financial development in the relationship between growth 
and oil rents (oil curse), models 2 and 3 were specified. The non-significant estimations of these 
two equations show no contribution of financial development in the oil curse neither through 
total credits nor through the credit provided to private sector. Model 4 and 5 compare the role 
of each financial indicator in enhancing economic growth. Model 4 indicates a positive but non-
significant effect of credit on economic growth while model 4 is significant at 1% level. This 
result approve that the Algerian credit policy has not been totally effective to drive the growth 
so that the national economy can escape the so-called “oil curse”. 
V - Concluding remarks: 
This paper investigated in the impact of the Algerian financial system, as one of major 
oil economies, on the economic growth and escaping the oil curse. It tested the effect of two 
financial development indicators and the oil rents on the Algerian economic growth using 
growth regression estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The empirical results showed that the financial sector has no longer contributed in 
reducing the negative effect of oil rents on economic growth (oil curse) and it has not contribute 
significantly to enhance economic growth. That is to say, Algeria needs more development in 
its financial sector. The culture of investment is missed in the national society which makes the 
credit provided to private sector inefficient. The excluded variable of the institutional quality 
explains also the non-significant results. The lack of good governance and the existence of 
corruption impede any path to a development then to efficient financial and monetary policies. 
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